Tarski is famous for his widely accepted conceptual analysis (or, in his terms, "explication") of the notion of truth for formal languages and the allied notions of satisfaction, definability, and logical consequence. Tarski was heavily influenced by the visible success of conceptual analysis in set-theoretic topology as practiced by the leading mathematicians at the University of Warsaw in the 1920s, and so formulated his analyses of semantical concepts in general set-theoretical terms. But the actual forms which his definitions took are puzzling in a number of respects. The question of motivation is also difficult because there was no prima facie compelling reason for dealing in precise terms with the semantical notions. These had been used quite confidently, without any such explication, by a number of Tarski's contemporaries, including Skolem and Gödel. The aim of this paper is to throw greater light on both the "why" and "how" questions concerning Tarski's conceptual analysis of semantical notions, especially that of truth.
that certain problems (and specifically the Entscheidungsproblem in logic) are uncomputable; prior to that, the informal concept of computability sufficed for all positive applications. I shall argue that there was no similarly compelling logical reason for Tarski's work on the concept of truth, and will suggest instead a combination of psychological and programmatic reasons. On the other hand, the "how" part in Tarski's case at one level receives a simple one-line answer: his definition of truth is given in general set-theoretical terms. That also characterizes his analyses of the semantical concepts of definability, logical consequence and logical operation. In fact, all of Tarski's work in logic and mathematics is distinguished by its resolute employment of set-theoretical concepts. However, the form in which these were employed shifted over time and the relations between the different accounts are in some respects rather puzzling. It is my aim here to educe from the available evidence the nature and reasons for these shifts and thereby to throw greater light on both the "why" and "how" questions concerning Tarski's conceptual analyses of semantical notions, especially that of truth. The main puzzle to be dealt with has to do with the relations between the notions of truth in a structure and absolute truth. Lukasiewicz. Tarski's choice of concentration on mathematics and logic in this period was fortuitous due to the phenomenal intellectual explosion in these subjects in Poland following its independence in 1918. On the side of logic this has been richly detailed by Jan Wolenski in his indispensable book about the Lvov-Warsaw school (1989) . A valuable account on the mathematical side is given in the little volume of "remembrances and reflections" by Kazimierz Kuratowski, A Half Century of Polish Mathematics (1980) . The grounds for the post-war explosion in Polish mathematics were laid by a young professor, Zygmunt Janiszewski. He had obtained a doctor's degree in the then newly developing subject of topology in Paris in 1912, and was appointed, along with the topologist, Stefan Mazurkiewicz, to the faculty of mathematics at the University of Warsaw in 1915. It was Janiszewski's brilliant idea to establish a distinctive Polish school of mathematics and to make an impact on the international scene by founding a new journal called Fundamenta Mathematicae devoted entirely to a few subjects undergoing active development. 3 Namely, it was to concentrate on the modern directions of set theory, topology, mathematical logic and the foundations of mathematics that had begun to flourish in Western Europe early in the Twentieth Century.
Tarski's teachers in mathematics at the University of Warsaw were the young and vital Waclaw Sierpinski, Stefan Mazurkiewicz and Kazimierz Kuratowski; Sierpinski and Mazurkiewicz were professors and Kuratowski was a docent. In 1919, the year that Tarski began his studies, the old man of the group was Sierpinski, aged thirty-seven;
Mazurkiewicz was thirty-one, while Kuratowski at twenty-three was the "baby". The senior member in the Warsaw mathematics department, Waclaw Sierpinski, was especially noted for his work in set theory, a subject that Tarski took up with a vengeance directly following his doctoral work on Lesniewski's system of protothetic. Though Cantorian set theory was still greeted in some quarters with much suspicion and hostility, it was due to such people as Sierpinski in Poland and Hausdorff in Germany that it was transformed into a systematic field that could be pursued with as much confidence as more traditional parts of mathematics.
The main thing relevant to the present subject that I emphasized in my Warsaw lecture concerning this background in Tarski's studies is that in the 1920s, the period of his intellectual maturation in mathematics, topology was dominated by the set-theoretical approach, and its great progress lay as much in conceptual analysis as in new results. We take the definitions of the concepts of limit point, closed set, open set, connected set, compact set, continuous function, and homeomorphism--to name only some of the most basic ones--so much for granted that it takes some effort to put ourselves back in the frame of mind of that fast-evolving era in which such definitions were formulated and came to be accepted. Of course, some of the ideas of general topology go back to Cantor and Weierstrass, but it was not until the 1910s that it emerged as a subject in its own right.
Tarski couldn't have missed being impressed by the evident success of that work in its use of general set theory in turning vague informal concepts into precise definitions, in terms of which definite and often remarkable theorems could be proved. 3 Sadly, Janiszewski died in the flu epidemic of 1919-20 and did not live to see its first issue.
The paradigmatic case of dimension. In particular, a very interesting case of conceptual analysis in topology took place during Tarski's student days. This concerned the idea of the dimension of various geometrical objects and began with a puzzle over how to define in precise terms what it means to be a curve as a one-dimensional set. Informally, the idea of a curve that had been used up to the 1800s was that of a figure traced out by a moving point. As part of the progressive rigorization of analysis in the nineteenth century, Camille Jordan had proposed to define a curve (for example, in the plane or in space) as the continuous image of a line segment. When Giuseppe Peano showed, quite surprisingly, that the continuous image of a line segment could fill up a square in the plane, a new definition was urgently called for. There were a number of candidates for that, but the one relevant to our story and one that succeeded where Jordan's definition failed is that provided by Karl Menger in Vienna in 1921. 4 The details of his definition, which explains in quite general topological terms which sets in a topological space can be assigned a natural number as dimension, are not important for the present story. What is important is that Menger was soon in communication with the Warsaw topologists, including
Kuratowski and Bronislaw Knaster (who was a close friend of Tarski) , and that his conceptual analysis of the notion of dimension had a direct impact on their work. In
Tarski's 1931 paper on definable sets of real numbers, the notion of dimension (among other intuitive geometrical notions) is specifically referred to as a successful example of conceptual analysis.
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My conclusion is that for Tarski, topology was paradigmatic in its use of set theory for conceptual analysis.
In my Warsaw lecture I went in some detail into the form of Tarski's use of set theory in his analyses of the concepts of truth, logical consequence and of what is a logical notion, and how it was that in this last, Tarski assimilated logic to higher set theory to (what I regard as) an unjustified extent.
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But that only answers the "how" part of our basic question at one level, and for a fuller answer, one must probe deeper in each case.
That will only be done here for the concept of truth; for the case of logical consequence, see the rewarding discussion in Gómez-Torrente (1996) . 4 See Menger (1994) , pp. 38ff. An essentially equivalent definition was given by Paul Urysohn in Moscow, independently of Menger's and around the same time. 5 See p. 112 of the English translation of (1931) in Tarski (1983) . Interestingly, he remarks loc. cit. that, in contrast to the geometrical examples--in which there are competing conceptual analyses in mathematical terms because the informal notions are a confused mix--the "arbitrariness" in that of definability and related logical notions is "reduced almost to zero" because the intuitions to which they respond "are more clear and conscious." 6 For my critique of Tarski's analysis of what is a logical notion, see Feferman (1999 with an informal explanation of the current conception. Hodges then goes on to report (p.
137) that:
[a] few years ago I had a disconcerting experience. I read Tarski's famous monograph 'The concept of truth in formalized languages ' (1935) to see what he says himself about the notion of truth in a structure. The notion was simply not
there. This seemed curious, so I looked in other papers of Tarski. As far as I could discover, the notion first appears in Tarski's address (1952) to the 1950
International Congress of Mathematicians, and his paper 'Contributions to the theory of models I ' (1954) . But even in those papers he doesn't define it. In the first paper he mentions the notion only in order to explain that he won't be needing it for the purpose in hand. In the second paper he simply says "We assume it to be clear under what conditions a sentence ... is satisfied in a system..."
Hodges continues, "I believe that the first time Tarski explicitly presented the mathematical definition of truth in a structure was his joint paper (1957) with Robert Vaught." In fact, the general notion of structure for a first-order language L is already described in Tarski's 1950 ICM address, essentially as follows: a structure A is a sequence consisting of a nonempty domain A of objects together with an assignment to each basic relation, operation and constant symbol of L of a corresponding relation between elements of A, operation on elements of A, or member of A, resp.. Moreover, while Hodges is correct in saying that the notion of truth in a structure is not defined there, Tarski does talk of the antecedent notion of satisfaction in a structure as if it is well understood, since he refers to the association with each formula ϕ of the set of all sequences from A which satisfy ϕ in A .
At any rate, what is of interest, as Hodges makes clear, is that these notions of structure, and of satisfaction and truth in a structure, do not seem to appear explicitly prior to the 1950s in Tarski's work. This is doubly puzzling, since, as a common informal notion, the idea of a structure being a model of a system of axioms well precedes that, and surely goes back to the nineteenth century. Most famously in that period, one had the stunning revelation of various models for non-Euclidean geometry. clearly shifted to the current model-theoretic way of thinking (see Tarski and Givant 1999 ).
The second locus was the method of elimination of quantifiers to arrive at decision procedures for all first-order statements true in certain models or classes of models. That method had been developed initially by Skolem, who applied it to the monadic theory of identity, and Langford, who applied it to the theory of dense order. The method was pursued intensively in Tarski The first intended 7 Incidentally, Scanlan points out that Tarski was aware of that work in his abstract (1924) , where a secondorder system of axioms is given for the order relation on ordinals which, when restricted to the accessible ordinals, is said to be categorical "au sens de Veblen-Huntington". 8 In addition to the two here, Hodges (personal communication) has suggested a third: propositional logics and their matrix models. 9 See Vaught (1986) for the historical development, though presented in current model-theoretic terms.
exposition of the latter was the monograph (1967) whose scheduled publication in 1940 was postponed indefinitely because of the war. Rather than containing a model-theoretic statement of the results, this is devoted to establishing the completeness of axiom systems for elementary algebra and geometry, and by its methods as providing a decision procedure for provability in those systems. Chronologically, it is not until the full exposition of the elimination of quantifiers method in the report (1948) , prepared with the assistance of J. C. C. McKinsey, that it is presented frankly as a decision procedure for truth in the structure of real numbers. There is a corresponding marked difference in the titles between the two publications.
Tarski's acceptance of type theory as a general framework. Hourya Sinaceur (2000, pp. 8-9) has emphasized this difference between Tarski's point of view prior to 1940 and his shift to our current way of thinking, perhaps around that time. Indeed, in the primary relevant pre-war publications, specific mathematical theories are always regarded by Tarski within an axiomatic framework, often expanded to the simple theory of types, and he refrained from speaking of structures as if they were independently existing entities.
As is documented fully in Ferreirós (1999) , pp. 350-356, this was the accepted way of formulating things for a number of logicians and philosophers in the 1930s, under the powerful residual influence of Principia Mathematica. 10 We have only to look at the title of Gödel's incompleteness paper (1931) for the most famous example, where the system actually referred to is a form of the simple theory of types based on the natural numbers as the individuals. Tarski carried so far the identification of mathematical concepts with those that can be developed in the simple theory of types, that he wrote the following in his introductory textbook on logic, after sketching how the natural numbers can be treated as classes of classes and thus based "on the laws of logic alone": the ...fact that it has been possible to develop the whole of arithmetic, including the disciplines erected upon it--algebra, analysis, and so on--, as a part of pure logic, 10 The shift from the ramified theory of types (RTT), as a basis for "all" of mathematics in the Principia, to the simple theory of types (STT) was given impetus in publications by Chwistek in 1920 and Ramsey in 1926, but was also spread informally by Carnap among others. (Reck (2002) Insofar as this statement regards the simple theory of types, necessarily with the axiom of infinity, as a part of pure logic, Tarski here blithely subscribes to the logicist program, thereby ignoring the fact that the infinity axiom is not a logical principle and that the platonist ontology normally seen to be required to justify the impredicative comprehension axioms of the theory put their logical status into question.
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At the same time, the formulation of mathematical notions in axiomatic terms as deductive theories on their own or within a wider "logical" framework, such as the theory of types, may be related to Tarski's (later) professed nominalistic, anti-platonistic, tendencies (cf. Feferman 1999a, p. 61) , but that in turn is clearly in tension with his thorough-going use of set theory in practice, and his acceptance from the beginning of Zermelo's axioms as a framework for his extensive purely set-theoretical work. 13 It should be remarked that over a long period (1924) he speaks of the categoricity of a (second-order) system of axioms for the ordinals up to the first inaccessible (cf. ftn. 7 above); this work is presented in more detail in sec. 4 of Lindenbaum and Tarski (1926) ; was also strongly influenced by Lesniewski's theory of semantical categories in this respect. For a full account of type theory at its zenith, cf. Ferreirós (1999) (iii) in a further editorial remark (ibid.), Tarski says that he obtained an upward form of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem in the period of the aforementioned seminar;
(iv) in the appendix to (1935/36) Tarski (informally) defines for each order type α the set T(α) of all elementary properties true of any pair consisting of a set X and binary relation R that orders X in order type α; he then defines two order types α and β to be elementarily equivalent when T(α) = T(β) and gives various examples for which this holds and for which it doesn't hold; in a footnote he says that these notions can be applied to arbitrary relations, not just ordering relations; at the end of this Appendix it is stated that these ideas emerged in the Warsaw seminar of 1926-28, but that he was able to state them in "a correct and precise form" only with the help of the methods later used to define the notion of truth;
(v) in the same Appendix, using the fact that T(ω) = T(ω + ω* + ω) Tarski Berry, concerning truth and definability, respectively. While these did not seem to have anything to do with questions of truth and definability in the algebraic and geometrical structures of the sort with which Tarski had been dealing, they affected him in the following way, that I consider to be a further psychological aspect of the "why" problem.
Namely, from early on he seemed to think that it was the metamathematical (i.e. syntactic)
form in which those concepts were defined that was a principal obstacle to mathematicians' appreciation of the subject, if not outside of the purview of mathematics altogether. Thus, for example, at the outset of his 1931 paper "On definable sets of real numbers", he writes:
Mathematicians, in general, do not like to deal with the notion of definability; their attitude toward this notion is one of distrust and reserve. The reasons for this aversion are quite clear and understandable. To begin with, the meaning of the term 'definable' is not unambiguous: whether a given notion is definable depends on the deductive system in which it is studied .. there. Under the mathematical definition, on the other hand, the definable sets and relations (of order 1 in the type structure) are simply those generated from certain primitive sets of finite sequences corresponding to the atomic formulas, by means of Boolean operations and the operations of projection and its dual. 18 Later in the paper, it is indicated how to generalize this to definability over an arbitrary structure, as introduced by the following passage:
In order to deprive the notion of elementary definability (of order 1) of its accidental character, it is necessary to relativize it to an arbitrary system of primitive concepts or--more precisely--to an arbitrary family of primitive sets of [finite] sequences. In this relativization we no longer have in mind the primitive concepts of a certain special science, e.g. of the arithmetic of real numbers. The set Rl is now replaced by an arbitrary set V (the so-called universe of discourse or universal set) and the 17 Quotations are from the English translation in Tarski (1983), pp.110-111. 18 In the follow-up paper with Kuratowski, these are shown to be imbedded in the hierarchy of projective sets in Euclidean space. contemporaneous with the work just described on definability in a structure (and implicitly of truth in a structure), but now directed primarily to a philosophical rather than a mathematical audience. 21 Later presentations would also be similarly oriented, including his 1936 lecture to the Congrès Internationale de Philosophie Scientifique and his 1944
paper "The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics" published in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Clearly, Tarski thought that as a side result of his work on definability and truth in a structure, he had something important to tell the philosophers that would straighten them out about the troublesome semantic paradoxes such as the Liar, by locating for them the source of those problems. Namely, on Tarski's view, everyday language is inherently inconsistent via ordinary reasoning about truth as if it were applicable to all sentences of the language. The notion of truth can be applied without contradiction only to restricted formalized languages of a certain kind, and the definition of truth for such languages requires means not expressible in the languages themselves. This, of course, makes truth prima-facie into a relative notion, namely relative to a language, as definability was emphasized above to be a notion relative to a structure. Nevertheless, as presented in the Wahrheitsbegriff, it should in my view be considered to be an absolute notion, albeit a fragment of such. How can that be? The difference is that we are not talking about truth in a structure but about truth simpliciter, as would be appropriate for a philosophical discussion, at least of the traditional kind. This is borne out by a number of passages, of which those that follow are only a sample (quoted from the English translation in (1983)).
After explaining the need to restrict to formalized languages of a special kind to avoid the paradoxes, Tarski writes:
...we are not interested here in "formal" languages and sciences in one special sense of the word "formal", namely sciences to the signs and expressions of which no meaning is attached. For such sciences the problem here discussed [of defining truth] has no relevance, it is not even meaningful. We shall always ascribe quite concrete and, for us, intelligible meanings to the signs which occur in the languages we shall consider. (1983, pp.166-7) The definition of truth is illustrated in sec. 3 of the Wahrheitsbegriff for the language of the calculus of classes of the domain of individuals within the simple theory of types.
Nothing is said about the nature of that domain except that it must be assumed to be infinite In the investigations which are in progress at the present day in the methodology of the deductive sciences ( in particular in the work of the Göttingen school grouped around Hilbert) another concept of a relative character plays a much geater part than the absolute concept of truth and includes it as a special case. This is the concept of correct or true sentence in an individual domain a. By this is meant ... every sentence which would be true in the usual sense if we restricted the extension of the individuals considered to a given class a, or--somewhat more precisely--if we agreed to interpret the terms 'individual', 'class of individuals', etc. as 'element of the class a', 'subclass of the class a', etc., respectively.
22 (1983, p. 199) And, further on in this connection, we have:
...the general concept of correct sentence in a given domain plays a great part in present day methodological researches. But it must be added that this only concerns researches whose object is mathematical logic and its parts. .. problem is to specify meanings by translations into an informally specified metalanguage associated with the given language, within which meanings are supposed to be already understood. 23 (1983, pp. 170-171) 22 In a footnote, Tarski warns off the philosophical part of his audience from the relativized definition, saying that "it is not necessary for the understanding of the main theme of this work and can be omitted by those readers who are not interested in special studies in the domain of the methodology of the deductive sciences... ." 23 Hartry Field (1972) has emphasized this as Tarski's way of solving the problem of supplying meaning, and argued that it is inadequate for a physicalist theory of truth. It is a separate, and debatable issue, Incidentally, and this is a separate issue worthy of discussion but not pursued here, these languages are not only taken to be interpreted, but are also supposed to carry a deductive structure specified by axioms and rules of inference. notion of truth throws on that of provability, but of course that is unnecessary to the task of defining truth for a given language given solely by the assumed meaning of its basic notions and the syntactic structure of its sentences.
Was Tarski a logical universalist?
In a first draft of this article I argued that the distinction between treating truth in an absolute rather than relative sense has to do with that first elicited by Jean van Heijenoort in his short but innovative article, "Logic as calculus and logic as language " (1967a, 1985) . 25 In brief, according to van Heijenoort, for Boole has his universal class, and De Morgan his universe of discourse, denoted by '1'. But these have hardly any ontological import. They can be changed at will.
The universe of discourse comprehends only what we agree to consider at a certain time, in a certain context. For Frege it cannot be a question of changing universes.
One could not even say that he restricts himself to one universe. His universe is the universe. Not necessarily the physical universe, of course, because for Frege some objects are not physical. Frege's universe consists of all that there is, and it is fixed. (1985, pp. 12-13) Russell's adaptation of this was in the ramified theory of types. The Frege-Russell viewpoint is certainly understandable if their systems are regarded as embodying purely whether Tarski's program to establish semantics on a scientific basis, as described in his (1936), would require him to meet Field's demands for such a theory. 24 In the German of (1935), the first part of this reads: "Aussagen, die als Axiome ausgezeichnet wurden, scheinen uns inhaltlich wahr zu sein..." 25 See also van Heijenoort (1976) and Hintikka (1996) . logical notions. The work of the Wahrheitsbegriff, I argued, is presented in that universalist tradition, though the framework is modified to that of the pure simple theory of types (STT) rather than the ramified one, and is used informally rather than formally; in addition, as we have already remarked, the axiom of infinity is assumed in order to make use of the natural numbers within the theory. All that is in apparent conflict with the change of perspective represented by the Postscript to the Wahrheitsbegriff, as detailed in the very persuasive article on Tarski and the universalism of logic by Philippe de Rouilhan (1998), which was brought to my attention in the meantime. 26 On reconsideration, I have to agree that my claim needs to be qualified, though not necessarily radically; as this, too, is a side issue, but one that I want to address here, I will be as brief as the matter allows.
In the body of the Wahrheitsbegriff (cf. especially pp. 215 ff of (1983)), Tarski subscribed to Lesniewski's theory of semantical categories (credited to Husserl in its origins). Considered formally, this contains STT, called by Tarski in some places the theory of sets (e.g., p. 210, ftn. 2) and elsewhere the general theory of classes (e.g., pp.
241-242). Part of the significance of the theory of semantical categories is supposed to be its universality:
The language of a complete system of logic should contain--actually or potentially--all possible semantical categories which occur in the languages of the deductive sciences. Just this fact gives to the language mentioned a certain "universal" character, and it is one of the factors to which logic owes its fundamental importance for the whole of deductive knowledge. (1983, p. 220).
Every semantical category can be assigned a natural number as order, the order of expressions of that category: the order of individual terms is lowest and the order of a relational expression is the supremum of the orders of its arguments plus one. The order of a language consonant with the doctrine of semantical categories is the supremum of the orders of the expressions in that language, thus either a natural number or the first infinite ordinal ω. A metalanguage in which truth is to be defined for a given language must be of higher order than the order of the language. In sec. 4 of the Wahrheitsbegriff, Tarski sketched how to define truth for languages of finite order, while in sec. 5 he argued that there is no way to do that for languages of infinite order, since there is no place for a metalanguage to go, if it is to be part of the universal language.
But in the Postscript to the Wahrheitsbegriff, Tarski abandoned the theory of semantical categories, so as to allow for languages of transfinite order in some sense or other. The nature of such is only sketched there and the details are problematic; the difficulties are well explained by de Rouilhan in the article mentioned above. In any case, the idea of a universal language is clearly abandoned in the Postscript, and in that sense, qua (meta-) mathematician, he is after a concept of truth relative to a language. And that has to do with the tension between the two sides of Tarski's efforts with respect to the semantical notions, the one represented in the Wahrheitsbegriff for philosophers, and the original one for mathematicians, described above.
Next we see how this opposition affects the single most famous feature of the Wahrheitsbegriff, the truth scheme.
What the truth scheme does and doesn't do. It is for truth simpliciter treated within the framework of STT that Tarski can formulate the conditions required of a "materially adequate" definition of truth for a language L of finite order in its metalanguage (inside STT). That takes the form of the scheme (or "convention", in his terminology) (T) x is a true sentence if and only if p, each instance of which is given by substituting for 'x' the name of a sentence in L, and for 'p' the sentence itself as it is given in its metalanguage. In particular, in the case that L is the language of a specific mathematical structure A whose underlying domain, relations, operations and distinguished elements are taken to be given in the metalanguage, we can replace 'true sentence' in the left hand side of (T) by 'sentence true in A '. That is how it is which its definition can be expressed. However, it has proved to be possible to characterize this notion in purely mathematical terms and to discuss it by means of normal mathematical methods. The theory of arithmetical classes has thus become a mathematical theory in the usual sense of this term, and in fact it can be regarded as a chapter of universal algebra. ((1952), p. 705, reprinted in (1986) 
The means by which this is accomplished is by a kind of uniform extension across the given similarity class of the basic relations and operations on them that Tarski had used to explain the notion of definable relation in (1931) . In the terminology of (1952) these are given by arithmetical functions F whose domain is the given similarity class and which for each A in that class has for its value a subset of the set A ω of infinite sequences of elements of the domain A of A . and at a crucial point in the development, the effort at "normal" mathematization even breaks down. Namely, one of the main results of (1952) is Theorem 13, the compactness theorem for arithmetical functions, which takes the form that if K is any subclass of AF whose intersection is the function Z that assigns the empty set to each structure, then there is a finite subset L of K whose intersection is Z. The compactness theorem for AC is a corollary. Of this, Tarski says, "[a] mathematical proof of Theorem 13 is rather involved. On the other hand, this theorem easily reduces to a metamathematical result which is familiar from the literature, in fact to Gödel's completeness theorem for elementary logic." No indication is given as to what "mathematical proof" of this theorem Tarski had in mind; the first published candidate that might be considered to qualify for such would be the one using ultraproducts (a "mathematical" notion) given ten years later by Frayne, Morel and Scott (1962) . But even that depends on the fundamental property of ultraproducts relating truth in such a product to truth in its factors, the formulation and proof of which makes essential use of syntax.
Though some of the language and notation such as AC and AC δ introduced in Tarski (1952) has survived in the model-theoretic literature, that of the vehicle of arithmetical functions has not, and--as far as I can tell--the impact of this approach on mathematicians outside of logic was nil. 29 Tarski himself abandoned it soon enough in favor of normal metamathematical explanations connecting semantics to syntax, finally fully spelled out in Tarski and Vaught (1957) . Of course, all of that is unproblematically a part of ordinary set-theoretical mathematics, in accord with Tarski's basic vision of the subject. 28 In van Heijenoort (1967), p. 151. 29 And within logic it had a specific unfortunate result: at Tarski's behest, Wanda Szmielew reformulated her important elimination of quantifiers procedure for Abelian groups in terms of the language of arithmetical functions (Szmielew 1955) , turning something already rather complicated syntactically into an unreadable piece that, perversely, served even further to hide the underlying mathematical facts. Eklof and Fisher (1972) subsequently reestablished her results by means of understandable standard model-theoretic techniques in a way that also brought the needed facts into relief.
Coda. In bringing his work on truth simpliciter to the attention of philosophers via the simply stated truth scheme (T), Tarski classes, but of its basic "metamathematical" version of satisfaction and truth in a structure, and has been accepted by mathematicians without qualms about those notions. So Tarski's continual concerns in that respect were, in my view, quite misplaced.
To conclude, I must return to the question implicitly raised at the beginning of this essay by the statement that--in the view of many--Tarski's definition of truth is one of the most important cases of conceptual analysis in twentieth century logic.
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Namely, how important is it? I have been told by more than one colleague (no names, please) over the years that Tarski was merely belaboring the obvious. I have to agree that there is some justice to this criticism, at least if we're thinking about the notions of satisfaction and truth in a structure--after all, the definitions are practically forced on us. But even if that's granted, Tarski's explication of these concepts, at least in the way that it was presented in the 1950s, has proved to be important as a paradigm for all the work in recent years on the semantics of a great variety of logical and computational languages as well as parts of natural language. And it has raised interesting questions about possible other approaches to informal semantics when that paradigm doesn't seem to apply in any direct way (cf. 
